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  Abstract 
 
A key asset that is important in international markets is real estate—raw land and 
developed properties.  Also, real estate can clearly have difference local rules for 
investment and transactions based upon bankruptcy protection, appraisal standards, 
lending standards, taxation and planning processes across countries.  This can be 
particularly true when assessing a developing country.  In this research, we assess the 
relative pricing behavior for land in Beijing China. We see this as important for three core 
reasons.  First, China has a strong growth economy but is still in many ways an 
undeveloped country and thus we do not have significant data about asset pricing behavior 
there. Second, China has not traditionally had a market based land and property transfer 
system. Thus, it is interesting to assess how prices are determined relative to typical market 
expectations. Third, we have extensive evidence on pricing behavior in the USA and 
Europe but little such evidence on China. Are the same variables important in Land pricing 
in China and are there other unique local variables. For example, there have been 
twenty-two articles published in core journals on Chinese land and only two provide 
empirical estimates of  value attributes and none of  there are as extensive as our study.  
Thus, we consider a large data set of  land prices in Beijing China and assess the relative 
pricing behavior. 
 
Our key results are that pricing behavior in general follows the traditional expected 
variables as determined by size, planning use, location and other neighborhood 
characteristics. However, we also find that land prices are associated with buyer 
characteristics; for example, foreign investors pay less than local investors. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Real estate is an important local and international asset estimated to be about 55 
percent of  world assets not including human capital. Real estate has also been an 
important part of  China’s growth and has posed interesting challenges in that China 
until recently recognized no public market for real estate or related assets (e.g., 
development rights).  An important part of  real estate markets is the differing set of  
local rules for investment and transactions based upon bankruptcy protection, appraisal 
standards, lending standards, taxation and planning processes across countries.  This 
can be particularly true when assessing a developing country such as China.  In this 
research, we assess the relative pricing behavior for land in Beijing China. We believe 
that this is important for three core reasons.  First, China has a strong growth 
economy but is still in many ways an undeveloped country and thus we do not have 
significant data about asset pricing behavior there.  Second, China has not traditional 
had a market based land and property transfer system—thus, it is interesting to assess 
how prices are determined relative to typical market expectations. Third, we have 
extensive evidence on pricing behavior in the USA and Europe but little such evidence 
on China—are the same variables important in land pricing in China and are there other 
unique local variables1.  There is also a scarcity of  evidence from China. For example 
of  the 22 key articles published on land in the last five years, only two article shave 
provided empirical estimates2.  And those two articles are not as extensive in their data 
or analysis as this research.  Thus, we consider a large data set of  land prices in Beijing 
China and assess the relative pricing behavior. 
 
Our key result is that pricing behavior in general follows the traditional expected 
variables as determined by size, planning use, location and other neighborhood 
characteristics.  We also find that land prices are associated with buyer characteristics; 
for example, foreign investors pay less than local investors3.  
 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 the literature of  land value 
determination is reviewed.  Section 3 outlines the hypotheses to be tested and the 
                                                        
1 For example, although foreign direct investment is encouraged in China, it is highly regulated in real 
estate development area.  On 6 March 2007, the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC issued some 
instructions on attracting foreign investment in 2007.  It is clearly stated that real estate is one of the 
sectors where foreign investment is strictly restricted. (Source: http://www.mofcom.gov 
.cn/aarticle/b/f/ 200703/20070304485330.html).  
2
 See Table 5 for details. 
3 We caution readers to be aware that this may be that the SOEs have bought a different bundle of goods 
than local investors that may not be captured by our explanatory variables. Later in the text we, argue 
that this is most likely true. 
research design, as well as details of  the data and empirical models used in our analysis.  
The empirical results are presented in session 4.  Section 5 provides an overall 
discussion and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature and Expectations 
 
2.1 Background and Setting 
 
China has gradually introduced market economy aspects into its once heavily 
centralized planning system and these reforms have effectively, along with strong 
economic growth, fueled strong urban expansion in China (Anderson and Ge, 2004).  
The central government first experimented with land right distribution to private users 
in 1987 in the costal city of  Shenzhen4.  Then, land values, or the premium payable to 
the government, were determined by private treaty between the government and 
potential buyers.  Without a land market in place, the agreed price was unlikely to 
reflect the market value of  the land 5 .  The central government soon thereafter 
introduced additional means of  land distribution – closed bidding (tender) and public 
auctions.  
 
 The central government recently pushed the sale of  land use rights through 
tenders and auctions across major cities in China. The percentage of  land right sales by 
private treaty drops steadily over years6.  This more market-oriented land distribution 
system proved to be a double-edged sword: competition among potential buyers 
increased land (and house) prices.  
 
There are extensive recent studies on China’s land market (Ding, 2013, Ding and 
Lichtenberg, 2011, Khantachavana et al., 2013, Lin and Ho, 2003, Wu et al., 2014). The 
establishment of  the land and housing markets in China has traditionally been a 
sensitive political matter because the ownership of  the land by the people has been one 
of  the key symbols of  the communist system.  However, land has been recognized by 
China’s leaders as an important resource of  economic activities.  To accommodate the 
need for both economic development and political stability, the country adopted the 
                                                        
4 Shenzhen remains an important city for China’s real estate market. JonesLangLaSalle in their recent 
report on China 30 use Shenzhen as the comparison city to measure the top 30 second tier cities.  
Even through JLL (2007) stress the growth opportunities of the second tier cities, Shenzhen tops them 
in terms of property index and economic index values (see city evaluation table, page 3). 
5 This argument is supported by the recent work of Choy and Chau (2007) where they argue that SOEs 
generally have been and continue to be given discounts on their land purchases.  Their work was on 
Shenzhen, but we believe this is applicable to other Chinese cities as well. 
6 In 2000 the percentage of land right sales by private treaty in China is 83.83%.  This figure dropped to 
63.34% in 2003 (China Land Resource Year Book 2001 & 2004).  
leasehold property right system7.  More specifically, because the country owns all land 
in China, the land use rights are granted to land users for fixed periods of  time, 
determined by the planning uses of  the land parcels.  Land users pay a lump sum 
premium to secure land leases from the government.  An additional annual nominal 
land use tax is also imposed.  In many cases this is to cover real maintenance and 
depletion costs associated with the property8.  A secondary land market also developed 
to facilitate the exchange of  land use right among lessees, which is essentially the 
transaction of  land leases9.  
 
The significant economic growth in China’s economy has also meant increased 
property values. These property value increases have attracted the attention of  foreign 
as well as domestic investors. However a key concern is to what extent the values of  
property are market set?  China’s long history of  planning, ownership and control of  
land raises concerns by investors and researchers about the stability of  property market.  
Our conjecture is that the land market in China has not reached a mature 
market-oriented stage10. 
 
In a market-oriented land distribution method, land values are determined by 
common factors such as those suggested by traditional urban economics theory and 
supported broadly by empirical findings.  However, the deep roots of  the planning 
system and the nature of  the communist system inevitably make uncertain the land 
value determination process in China.  Hence land values may also be determined by 
non-market factors as well as traditional market and institution forces.  In this research, 
we conduct an econometric analysis of  the land value determination mechanism in 
China using data from Beijing.   
 
 
                                                        
7 After China is established in 1949, land transaction had been illegal.  The Constitution is amended in 
1988 to legalize the transfer of land-uses right. This marks the starting point of the land market in 
China.  
8 According to the 1988 Urban Land Use Tax Provisional Regulations the land use tax is 0.5RMB – 
1RMB (1USD  8RMB) per square metre per annum in major cities.  
9 On 30 May 2001 the Ministry of Land and Resources P.R.C. released a guideline of regulating the China 
land market (http://www.mlr.gov.cn/pub/gtzyb/zcfg/tdglflfg/t20050406_66732.htm).  It stressed 
that the transfer of land uses right should be conducted in open market.  As a result, major cities in 
China started to establish land and property transaction centers to facilitate the transaction of land use 
rights.  For example, the Beijing Land Transaction Centre is established on 28 Feb 2002 by the Beijing 
Land Resource Development and Reclamation Centre (http://www.bjtd.com/) to facilitate land uses 
right transactions.  
10 This is consistent with Choy and Chau’s arguments (2007). They also argue that as markets are 
developed and there is less uncertainty as to land use (e.g., when major parts of cities have the 
development activity in place) they will be more market-based activities as opposed to government 
elated placements of land rights. 
2.2  The Determinants of Land Value 
  
Parcel size is traditionally recognized as an important determinant of  land values.  
The parcel size gradient is essentially an indicator of  the land subdivision and land 
assembly effects.  A convex structure, or a plottage effect, suggests there is a gain of  
land assembly. On the other hand, if  land subdivisions cause land value per unit to 
decrease with parcel size, then a concave relationship, or a plattage effect, present itself.  
The prevailing view in the literature is in favour of  a concave function form between 
parcel size and land value (Colwell and Munneke, 1999, Thorsnes and McMillen, 1998).  
 
There are also evidences suggesting a plottage effect of  parcel size for small land 
parcels with relatively homogeneous characteristics (Lin and Evans, 2000, Tabuchi, 
1996).  The study by Colwell and Munneke (1999) provided an explanation of  this 
puzzle by relating parcel size effect with location (e.g., distance to Central Business 
Districts).  They found that land price per unit is negatively related to parcel size in 
most urban area except for the urban center where a positive relationship is observed.  
Considering that Lin and Evans (2000) and Tabuchi (1996) used data from highly 
urbanized cities in Taiwan and Japan, it is not surprising that a convex structure was 
identified in their studies.   
 
Location is a second traditional determent of  value and generally serves as a proxy 
of  the social and economic characteristics of  the neighborhood of  the land parcel.  
Early studies on land value determination usually consider the distance to the Central 
Business District as the single important factor (Kau and Sirmans, 1979, Mcdonald and 
Bowman, 1979, Mcmillen, 1990).  Box-Cox transformation (see, for example, Kau and 
Sirmans, 1979; McMillen, 1990) and polynomial regression (McDonald and. Bowman, 
1979) are routinely utilized to detangle the relationship between the distance and land 
value. The empirical literature suggests that land values decrease consistently with the 
distance from the city center. Other measurement of  location vary such as distance to 
airports (Colwell and Munneke, 1999, McMillen, 1996), distance to the nearest train 
station (Cervero and Duncan, 2004, Tabuchi, 1996), and distance from the region 
boundary (Kowalski and Paraskevopoulos, 1990). District dummy variables have also 
been used (Cervero and Duncan, 2004), to name a few.  Consistently, land value is 
significantly influenced by location.     
 
The use of  location in land value functions is essentially an attempt to capture the 
social and economic environment of  the land.  Although measurement such as 
distance to CBD is a good proxy of  these factors, it is always preferable to quantify 
these factors directly in the model.  Some recent studies, benefiting from the increasing 
availability of  information, consider a wide range of  social-demographic attributes 
(Cervero and Duncan, 2004, Ihlanfeldt, 2007) and economic characteristics (McMillen 
and McDonald, 2002, Thorsnes, 2000) in the effort of  modeling land value. These 
factors are found to be helpful in explaining the land value determination mechanism in 
different jurisdictions.  
 
The zoning regulation and planning restrictions are also determining factors of  land 
value. Empirical evidences suggest that land use types (e.g., mixed use or single family 
residential uses) can claim a price premium in land (Brownstone and Devany, 1991, 
Cervero and Duncan, 2004). Also it has been shown that density controls reduce the 
price of  industrial land (Peiser, 1987) and that government regulation of  rent also 
influence the estimation of  land value function (Pasha, 1995). 
 
In China land is owned by the government.  There was no land market until late 
1980s, when the central government initiated a pilot run of  opening land market in 
Shenzhen, the southern frontier of  China’s open market policy.  At the early stage land 
was distributed through private treaties between the government and buyers.  Land 
values determined in these private treaties usually did not reflect its market value due to 
various political, social and economical considerations, and especially because the lack 
of  knowledge of  land value determination resulted by the planning system. 
  
Given the high population density and unbalanced economic development in China, 
the land market is inevitably characterized by high density usage. High-raise apartment 
buildings dominate the residential property market. Even international retail giant 
Wal-Marts has settled for a three-storage building for its largest outlet in Asia instead of  
using its typical one storage layout. Without any government interventions, developers 
may trade living quality with profit maximization by building the maximum possible 
floor area on a given piece of  land.  To ensure a desirable living condition, the 
government has imposed density control in all land leases. The density control is usually 
specified in the form of  plot ratios, which is essentially the ratio between floor area and 
parcel size. A larger plot ratio enables the developers to build more floor space, holding 
other elements constant.  
 
Unlike in other freehold property right systems, the planning purpose or the usage 
of  the land parcels is determined prior to the land transaction taking place. When 
municipal government has land parcels to be distributed by public auctions or tenders, 
information about these land parcels are released to the public.  The published 
information includes the designated usage of  the land (commercial, residential, 
industrial, or mixed), plot ratio, and other planning regulations. The change of  any of  
these planning regulations such as switching an industrial land to residential land is 
subject to approval.  Moreover, all land leases specify a maximum period before the 
developers start construction activities (usually 180 days).  This does not allow much 
luxury of  time for the developers to change land usage.  Therefore the public auction 
and tender price reflect the price of  a land parcel with a very specific usage.  
 
Although China has been opened its door to the world for more than 20 years, the 
historic planning economy system is still deeply rooted in the country.  The dominating 
role of  state-owned companies in the national economy is one important example.  It 
is still the fact that state-owned companies have the best access to financing.  This is 
particularly important for land investment given the significant value involved in a 
typical transaction. Private owned companies typically cannot compete directly with 
their state-owned counterparts.  It is reasonable to expect that in public land auction 
state-owned companies have a better chance to win the auction because of  their 
relatively larger size and easier access to capital.  
 
To attract foreign investment to fuel the economic development in China, both 
central and municipal government have been setting up favorable policies to encourage 
direct investment such as setting up factories11.  Besides conventional measures such as 
tax break and tax holidays, a discount on land price is also commonly used for this 
purpose. The ability of  attracting foreign direct investment is also considered to be an 
important indicator that helps in getting promoted.  Consequently, land parcels, and 
especially those for industrial usages, are leased to foreign invested companies with 
favorable price and/or lease terms.  
 




To summarize the discussion above, a market oriented land valuation system is still 
emerging in China and thus land value should be influenced by not only the ‘usual 
suspects’ such as size and location and regulations, but also by ‘Chinese Characteristics’ 
such as buyer traits.  To test this argument, the following hypotheses are set up. 
   
Hypothesis [1]: Land value is determined by traditional characteristics: parcel size, 
location, planning usage and neighborhood characteristics 
Hypothesis [2]: Buyer type influences land prices: at least one of  the buy 
characteristic dummies (state owned, privately owned, or foreign 
invested companies) should be significant  
To test the hypotheses, it is important to correctly model the relationship between 
land value and its determinants.  The relationship can be described by model (1) below.  
 
 ),,,,()( TBUNDfSgY                (1) 
 
Where Y is a 1n  vector of  land sales price, S denotes the parcel size, D is a 
1kn matrix of  variables measure the location of  the land parcel, N is a 2kn matrix 
of  neighborhood characteristics such as number of  employees in retail sectors, and total 
land area in each district, U is a 3kn matrix of  dummy variables indicating the 
planning usage of  the land, B consists of  4k indicators of  buyer characteristics, and 
                                                        
11 See the review of China’s tax incentive system in Chan and Mo (2000).  
finally, T is a 5kn matrix of  time dummies to capture land value movement over time. 
In Model (1) ),,,,( TBUNDf  takes a linear function form, whilst the relationship 
between land value and parcel size is described by an unknown function (.)g . Therefore 
(1) can be re-written as follows. 
 
  XSgY )(                    (2) 





ikk .  Given 
the functional form of  (.)g is unknown, model (2) can be estimated with a two-step 
semi-parametric procedure suggested in Robinson (1988).  A nonparametric estimator 
is adopted to obtain )|( SXE  and )|( SYE  using X and Y as dependent variables 
respectively.   and )(Sg  can be subsequently calculated with (3) and (4).  
        )|()|()|(')|(ˆ '1 SYEYSXEXSXEXSXEX         (3) 
ˆ)(ˆ XYSg                   (4) 
If  both )|( SXE  and )|( SYE  are estimated using ordinary least squares 
method, (3) will give the OLS coefficient estimates of  X and (4) will give the OLS 
coefficient estimate of  S.  Alternatively, )|( SE  can be estimated using a 
nonparametric estimator that offers more flexibility in the model building.  The 
following discussion illustrated the procedures to obtain )|( SYE  using a kernel 
estimator.  It can be easily extended to multivariate cases such as )|( SXE .  
Each element of  )|( SYE is estimated by a weighted average of  the value of  Y, 
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is the Gaussian kernel 
function. The smoothing parameter controls the smoothness of  the estimation. If  a 
approaches zero the kernel function tends to interpolate the data, whilst a very large 
smoothing parameter gives raise to imprecise estimates.  To select the optimal 
smoothing parameter the most commonly used method is minimizing the mean squared 










2*1 ˆ  
where *ˆ iy is calculated using (5) by omitting iy .  
  
3.2  Data and Empirical Model 
 
Beijing is the political and culture centre of  the nation.  It has a population of  
10.85 millions and covers an area of  16,808 square kilometers.  There are 18 municipal 
districts or counties in Beijing: four “inner city districts” (Dongcheng, Xicheng, 
Chongwen, and Xuanwu), four “outer city districts” (Haidian, Chaoyang, Fengtai, and 
Shijingshan), five “inner suburb counties” (Fangshan, Daxing, Tongzhou, Shunyi, 
Changping), and five “outer suburb counties” (Mentougou, Pinggu, Huairou, Miyun, 
and Yanqing).  Figure 1 depicts the geographic distribution of  these functional regions 
of  Beijing.  The inner city districts support the core functions of  the capital. The 
central government and most of  the foreign embassies are located in these four districts. 
Outer city districts hosts clusters of  rapidly expending research and educational 
institutions.  The eight city districts are the pillar of  the economic and culture 
prosperity of  Beijing. Compared with the city districts, the suburb counties have less 
economic connection with the city core. However, these regions have been growing 
rapidly by leveraging its rich ecological and tourism resources. The concentration of  
military units and the development of  heavy industry in the western suburb counties 
also fuel the development of  this region (Ding, 2004).  The land market in Beijing is 
not balanced among its functional regions. City districts witnessed a rapid development, 
but land for the physical expansion in these areas is limited. On the contrary, suburb 
counties have bountiful land and lower population density; thus, there is ample space for 
the land market development. 
 
Figure 1 Beijing City and Its Four Functional Regions 
 
The social and economics statistics given in Table 1 reveal the differences among 
the four functional regions in Beijing. Clearly the suburb regions are less developed, 
confirmed by their low population density, fewer migrants12, and less retail sales. The 
inner cities have the highest population density and the most migrants per kilometers, 
suggesting its strong standing in the social and economic activities in Beijing. 
Nevertheless, the development potential of  inner cities is limited due to the fact that the 
regions have already been fully developed.  The outer cities benefit from the larger land 
areas, the concentration of  higher education institutions, and easy access to CBD due to 
the fast expanding public transportation system. These suburb districts have been 
attracting a steadily growing amount of  real estate development.  
 






(in 100,Million RMB) 
Migrants 
(in 10,000) 
Inner cities 241.6 92.39 506.6 36.4 
Outer cities 957.2 1275.93 1063.9 209.2 
Inner suburbs 506 6295.57 264.7 94.4 
                                                        
12
 Migrants are residents that have been living in Beijing for more than six months but without 
changing their places of household registration to Beijing. It is also referred as ‘floating 
population’. See Zhu (2006) for a discussion on floating population and the household registration 
(Hukou) system in China.  
Outer suburbs 190.5 8746.65 134.9 17.3 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2004 – 2005  
 
The data used in this analysis are land sales records in Beijing from January 2005 to 
September 2006.  The data set pools land sale records from the Beijing Municipal 
Bureau of  Land and National Resources, social and economics statistics from the China 
Statistics Yearbook, buyer characteristics from the Tianjin AoKe QiTong Technology 
Development Ltd., and geographical information from the Longmap (Beijing) Ltd.  A 
total of  1,151 observations are collected, which accounts for more than 50% of  all land 
transactions in each year (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Sample Size by Year and Type 
  Non-industrial Industrial Total 
2005       
Public Transactions 26 0 26 
 (48) (0) (48) 
 [54.17%] -- [54.17%] 
Private treaty 398 163 561 
 (434) (267) (701) 
 [91.71%] [61.05%] [80.03%] 
Sub-total 424 163 587 
 (482) (267) (749) 
  [87.97%] [61.05%] [78.37%] 
2006    
Public Transactions 66 0 66 
 (86) (0) (86) 
 [76.74%] -- [76.74%] 
Private treaty 355 143 498 
 (665) (326) (991) 
 [53.38%] [43.87%] [50.25%] 
Sub-total 421 143 564 
 (751) (326) (1077) 
  [56.06%] [43.87%] [52.37%] 
Total 845 306 1151 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the total number of  land transactions in each category, and figures in 
square brackets are the sample size as a percentage of  the total number of  land transactions in each 
category.  
 
Descriptive statistics by transaction type and planning use are given in Table 3.  
Public transactions (i.e., listings, auctions and tenders combined) accounts for about 8% 
of  the overall transaction volume in the sampling period.  In general, land parcels that 
are transacted publicly are larger, further away from the central business district, and 
bought by privately owned domestic companies primarily.  Also, about one half  of  the 
residential land parcels are sold by public transaction, whist all industrial land parcels are 
transacted through private treaty.  The outer cities and Inner suburbs are the areas 
where the most transactions incurred, indicating a fast expansion of  real estate 
development into these regions.   
 
As a capital city, Beijing plays an important role in international affairs and serves as 
a center of  politics and culture in China. It still has a prominent economic position but 
is gradually switching from a production center to a service center.  As a result, land 
for industrial usage is declining, accounting for one-fifth of  the developed land. Whilst 
in other major cities in China, this percentage of  industrial land sales is much higher 
(Ding, 2004).  Although China has performed the economic system reform for more 
than a decade, most of  the characteristics of  planning economy still exist. State-owned 
companies remain the pillar of  china’s economy.  According to Table 3, roughly 50% 
of  the buyers are state-owned companies.  Foreign invested companies only bought 
less than 5% of  the land parcels sold.  The rest of  the land parcels are purchased by 
privately owned domestic companies.  
 
Models are estimated separately for industrial and non-industrial (i.e., residential, 
commercial, and mixed usages) land transactions because the prices of  these two types 
of  land parcels are determined differently.  For non-industrial land sales, land sales 
through private treaty are also modeled separately from public transactions because 
these transactions do not necessarily follow market rules.  In sum, two models, (6) and 
(7), are specified as given below. Model (6) is estimated using private treaty and public 
transaction data separately.  Model (7) is applied to industrial land sales, which are 
conducted through private treaty solely.  To facilitate comparison, variables included in 
the two models are identical, expect that USE_RES is omitted from model (7) because 
it’s not relevant in that model.  
 
 Non-industrial land transactions (public transactions and private treaty): 
lcitysubtrainldcbdldlpratiolsizeglupricenonind 43210 __)(    
lretaillareadisdisdis 98765 321    
firesuselmigrants 121110 _     
321 16151413 quarterquarterquarterprivate    
  654 191817 quarterquarterquarter          (6) 
 
 Industrial land transactions (private treaty only)13: 
lcitysubtrainldcbdldlpratiolsizeglupriceind 43210 __)(    
lretaillareadisdisdis 98765 321    
21 1413121110 quarterquarterprivatefilmigrants  
   6543 18171615 quarterquarterquarterquarter   (7) 
  
where  luprice nonind is the logarithms sales price per square meter in 10,000 RMB for 
non-industrial land parcels, and lupriceind is the logarithms sales price per square meter in 
                                                        
13
 In our sample all industrial land transactions are of private treaty type.  Therefore only one 
regression model is estimated for industrial land sales.  
10,000 RMB for industrial land parcels, quarteri are Quarterly time dummies (i = 
1,2,…,6). Other variables are defined in Table 3.  
 
 To test hypothesis one, we expect to see significant coefficient estimates for parcel 
size, plot ratio, planning usages, location variables, and neighborhood characteristics 
factors.  Because unit land prices are used as the dependent variable in this study, a 
negative relationship between land prices and parcel size is expected.  Also, land 
parcels with larger plot ratio and commercial planning usages should claim a premium.  
We also predict a negative relationship between land prices and the distance to essential 
transportation facilities (e.g., subway station for non-industrial land sales, and train 
station for industrial land sales). The social and economic characteristics of  the 
neighborhood should have impacts on land sales price as well.  
 
 To test hypothesis two, the coefficient estimates of  variables FI, PRIVATE, should 
be statistically significant. We suspect that state-owned companies pay more in land 
transactions because these firms have looser financial constrains and less profit-driven; 
foreign invested companies are more likely to get favorable sales prices given the 
municipal pro-foreign-investment policies.   
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics by Transaction Types and Planning Usages 
  
Public  




 Non-industrial  Non-industrial  Industrial 
  MEAN STD  MEAN STD  MEAN STD 
LUPRICE 6.37 1.07  6.58 0.83  5.3 1.19 
Logarithms sales price per square meter in 10,000 RMB (1USD 
≈ 8RMB) 
LSIZE 10.14 1.28  7.42 2.06  9.37 1.73 Logarithms parcel size in squared meters 
LPRATIO 0.65 0.69  0.57 1.01  -0.81 1.32 Logarithms plot ratio 
LD_CBD 2.43 1.21  1.72 1.17  2.19 0.85 Logarithms straight-line distance to the CBD in kilometers 
LD_TRAIN 2.75 1.12  1.99 1.03  2.71 0.78 
Logarithms straight-line distance to the nearest train station in 
kilometers 
LCITYSUB 0.34 0.68  0.39 0.77  0.37 0.69 
Logarithms straight-line distance to the nearest subway station 
in kilometers 
DIS1 0.13 0.34  0.22 0.42  0.02 0.15 Inner city districts (Yes=1) 
DIS2 0.28 0.45  0.47 0.5  0.27 0.45 
Outer city districts (Yes=1) 
DIS3 0.33 0.47  0.24 0.43  0.57 0.5 Inner suburb districts (Yes=1) 
DIS4 0.26 0.44  0.07 0.26  0.14 0.35 Outer city districts (Yes=1) 
LAREA 6.28 1.39  5.68 1.47  6.69 0.94 Logarithms district land area in thousand squared kilometers 
LRETAIL 8.27 1.42  9.14 1.01  8.36 0.99 
Logarithms district number of  employees in retail sectors in 
10,000 
LMIGRANTS 2.52 1.26  3.23 1.04  2.56 1.12 Logarithms district migrants population in 10,000 
USE_RES 0.5 0.5  0.11 0.32  0 0 Residential usage (Yes=1) 
FI 0.02 0.15  0.04 0.2  0.06 0.24 Foreign invested company buyer (Yes=1) 
PRIVATE 0.85 0.36  0.39 0.49  0.58 0.49 
Private domestic buyer (Yes=1) 
Sample size 92   753   306  
 
4. Empirical Outcomes 
 
Table 4 through Table 6 give the estimates and diagnostic statistics of  model (6) 
and (7).  In all tables the semi-parametric model is compared with its parametric 
counterpart in terms of  coefficient estimates, model fitting statistics and specification 
test.  10% of  the observations were randomly selected and reserved to calculate 
out-of-sample MSE. The parametric benchmark models are estimated by specifying a 
linear functional form for )|( SXE  and )|( SYE  in (3).  It is equivalent to 
regressing Y on both X and Z using OLS method.   
 
Overall the semi-parametric models yield more precise coefficient estimates and 
smaller prediction errors.  To verify if  the semi-parametric specification is valid, we 
adopted the Whang and Andrews version of  Hausman-type specification test (Hausman, 
1978, Whang and Andrews, 1993).  This test has been applied to semi-parametric 
estimation of  land price models by Thorsnes and McMillen (1998).  
Because 57.372 20,01.0   and 81.34
2
18,01.0  , the null hypothesis of  a linear functional 
form is rejected for all models.  Hence discussions hereafter are based on the 
semi-parametric output in Table 4 through Table 6.  
 
4.1  Non-industrial land sales (private treaty) 
 
The estimation of  Model (6) using non-industrial land sales by private treaty is 
given in Table 4.  We find that the prices are determined by size, location, planning use, 
and neighborhood characteristics.  One of  the buyer characteristics indicators is 
statistically significant. In general these outcomes are consistent with other recent 
studies of  Chinese land value determinants.  Both of  our hypotheses are supported by 
this set of  findings.  
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the semi-parametric estimation of  the price-size relationship 
and shows a negative relationship in general.  Unit land price drops as land parcel size 
increases except for land parcels of  very large sizes.  This is also supported by the 
negative coefficient loading of  plot ratio (e.g., the -0.36 coefficient for LPRATIO is 
significant at the 1% level in Table 4).  Generally speaking plot ratio determines the 
total floor space to be built on a site and a larger plot ratio tends to reduce the unit 
construction cost for these sites.  The change of  price-size pattern for very large land 
parcels is a possible outcome of  the shortage of  supply of  this type of  land. 
 
We include commercial, mixed and residential property in the non-industrial land 
sample.  The dummy variable USE_RES, indicating whether a land parcel is of  
residential use, is used to identify the hierarchy of  these land uses in Beijing.  We find 
that both commercial and mixed use land values are higher than residential ones. In 
Table 4 the coefficient estimates of  USE_RES is negative and significant at the 1% 
level.   
  
Buyers prefer land parcels that are closer to the train stations and the downtown 
subway network.  Accessibility to the subway system is important for both business 
and leisure.  The railroad transportation system has been the primary mode for freight 
and passenger movement in China (Xie et al., 2002).  In Beijing most of  the train 
stations are located at convenient, sometimes even central, locations.  It is not 
surprising to find that developers tend to pay a premium to acquire land parcels near 
these train stations.  LD_CBD is not significant, probably due to the fact that it’s 
correlated with LCITYSUB (i.e., some subway stations are located near or in the CBD).  
 
Table 4 Model estimation (Non-industrial land sales by private treaty) 
  Parametric Model Semi-parametric Model 
  Coef. Std.Dev Coef. Std.Dev 
INTERCEPT 4.94*** 0.59   
LSIZE -0.10*** 0.01   
LPRATIO -0.37*** 0.02 -0.36*** 0.02 
LAREA 0.18** 0.09 0.19** 0.09 
LRETAIL 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 
LMIGRANTS 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.06 
USE.RES -0.41*** 0.07 -0.43*** 0.07 
PRIVATE 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.08 
FI -0.28** 0.05 -0.25** 0.05 
LD.CBD -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 
LD.TRAIN -0.22*** 0.03 -0.19*** 0.03 
DIS1 1.46** 0.05 1.67*** 0.05 
DIS2 0.79** 0.57 0.94*** 0.57 
DIS3 0.01 0.35 0.06 0.35 
LCITYSUB -0.13*** 0.16 -0.13*** 0.16 
QUARTER1 0.20*** 0.03 0.17** 0.03 
QUARTER2 0.11 0.07 0.11** 0.07 
QUARTER3 0.19*** 0.07 0.17** 0.06 
QUARTER4 0.18** 0.07 0.16** 0.07 
QUARTER5 0.17** 0.07 0.13 0.07 
QUARTER6 0.36*** 1.07 0.36*** 1.07 
R Squares 0.63 0.65 
F Statistics 56.98 65.01 
In-sample MSE 0.27 0.25 
Out-of-sample MSE 0.19 0.19 
Specification Test 
2 42.95, p-value < 0.01 (Whang & Andrews 1993 ) 
*: Significant at the 10% level 
**: Significant at the 5% level 
***: Significant at the 1% level 
 
 




























Foreign investment companies pay less in private treaty for land use rights.  In 
China, performance of  a company is often evaluated by its scale (e.g., total operating 
income) instead of  profit.  Consequently, Chinese companies tend to be less profit 
oriented (Firth et al., 2006). Domestic companies, privately or state owned, are more 
motivated to expand their business rather than maximize profits.  In this sense it is 
often more important to obtain a land parcel than to negotiate a cheaper price.  
Furthermore, domestic companies have better access to financing through the 
state-owned banks.  The tie between state-owned developers and banks is well 
recognized.  What is not conspicuous to outsiders is the connection between private 
owned and state-owned land users.  Most of  the privately owned development 
companies are actually spin-offs of  state-owned companies14, or lead by people with 
close connection with the government.  Therefore domestic companies generally have 
good ‘Guanxi’ with state-owned banks, which provide these companies with good 
access to funding for the land transactions.  Thus, with better access to capital, it is not 
surprising that these state-related companies are able to pay more for land than outside 
investors. Another possible explanation of  this phenomenon is that foreign investment 
is encouraged in general in China.  Beijing is no exception. Foreign invested companies 
can leverage the pro-foreign-investment policies to agree upon a more favorable price in 
negotiations.  
 
Our findings also suggest that the land value in Beijing had been increasing steadily 
until the third quarter of  2006.  There are at least two reasons contributing to the 
sudden downturn of  land prices.  First, the number of  sales in the third quarter of  
2006 is almost doubled that of  other quarters in the sampling period, indicating an 
increase in land supply in this period.  Secondly, and more importantly, the central 
government announced several policies to dampen the over-heated property market, 
including a 20% value-added tax on property sales came into effect on 1 August 2006. 
The combined effect is a significant drop in land prices in the third quarter.  
                                                        
14 For example, Vanke Co. Ltd, the largest domestic real estate developer in China, is evolved from a 
state-owned company in Shenzhen.  
 
4.2  Non-industrial land sales (public transactions) 
 
The outputs of  Model (6) using non-industrial land sales by public transactions can 
be found in Table 5.  We observe some differences in land prices determination 
between private treaty and public transactions. First of  all, prices are influence by fewer 
factors in public transacted land sales.  For example, plot ratio is not statistically 
significant; Planning uses have little impact on land prices because the coefficient 
loading of  USE.RES is insignificant.  Secondly, and more importantly, buyer 
characteristics do not influence land prices. It appears that in open market transactions 
land prices are determined by market force only. This is of  significant policy implication 
by suggesting that public transaction is a more efficient way to determine land prices. In 
a well-functioning land market prices should not be influenced by buyer characteristics 
because all parties involved in the transaction have equal access to resources.  Our 
findings are in support of  Chinese governments’ decision to gradually increase the 
proportion of  land sales by public transactions.  
 
It is also worth noting that the price-size relationship appears to be reversed.  In 
Figure 3 the relationship between land value and parcel size is positive in general. This is 
not contradicting the findings in previous session if  the average size of  the land parcels 
sold in public transactions is taken into consideration.  More specifically, most land 
parcels involved in open market sales are larger than those in private treaty. The pattern 
depicted in Figure 3 is consistent with the pattern observed in Figure 2 when parcel size 
is very large.  Therefore both sets of  findings suggest that very large land parcels in 
Beijing are sold at a premium due to its size.  Unfortunately our data set does not 
contain the information that enables further investigation into this interesting pattern.  
We leave this matter for future research.  
 
Table 5 Model estimation (Non-industrial land sales by public transactions) 
  Parametric Model Semi-parametric Model 
  Coef. Std.Dev Coef. Std.Dev 
INTERCEPT 11.11*** 0.59   
LSIZE 0.13 0.01   
LPRATIO -0.30 0.02 -0.20 0.02 
LAREA -0.85 0.09 -1.20** 0.09 
LRETAIL 0.25 0.08 0.34 0.08 
LMIGRANTS 0.65** 0.06 0.70*** 0.06 
PRIVATE -0.32 0.07 -0.36 0.07 
FI -0.31 0.08 -0.06 0.08 
USE.RES 0.91 0.05 0.30 0.05 
LD.CBD -0.28 0.11 -0.33 0.11 
LD.TRAIN -0.27 0.03 -0.53 0.03 
DIS1 -5.19 0.05 -8.25** 0.05 
DIS2 -4.01** 0.57 -5.31*** 0.57 
DIS3 -1.58** 0.35 -2.40*** 0.35 
LCITYSUB -0.25 0.16 -0.44** 0.16 
QUARTER1 1.22** 0.03 0.54 0.03 
QUARTER2 0.85** 0.07 1.09** 0.07 
QUARTER3 0.04 0.07 -0.23 0.06 
QUARTER4 0.88** 0.07 0.75** 0.07 
QUARTER5 0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.07 
QUARTER6 -0.40 1.07 -0.36 1.07 
R Squares 0.54 0.67 
F Statistics 3.38 6.32 
In-sample MSE 0.67 0.48 
Out-of-sample MSE 0.49 0.81 
Specification Test 
2 3976.61, p-value < 0.01 (Whang & Andrews 1993 ) 
*: Significant at the 10% level 
**: Significant at the 5% level 
***: Significant at the 1% level 
 
 


























4.3  Industrial land sales (private treaty only) 
 
The land value determination mechanism for industrial land parcels is different 
from non-industrial land sales in many aspects (see Table 6).  From analysis not shown 
in the tables, we also find that industrial land prices are less than those of  commercial 
and residential lands15.  Also, industrial development has not been recently a priority in 
                                                        
15 In a preliminary analysis industrial and non-industrial land sales are pooled and modeled with 
regression method.  Land use type dummies are included in the model to capture the price difference 
among different land uses.  It is found that the coefficient estimate corresponding to industrial land 
use type has the smallest value among all land use type dummies.  This indicates the industrial land 
value is the lowest in Beijing.  
the Beijing area16. The politically sensitive domestic companies (private or state-owned) 
are understandably less interested in industrial land sales.  Thus, the competition for 
land and the associated prices are lower in the Beijing for industrial land compared to 
commercial and residential land.  Industrial land buyers may find it is easier to 
negotiate a favorable price in private treaty.  
 
Table 6 Model estimation (Industrial land sales by private treaty) 
  Parametric Model Semi-parametric Model 
  Coef. Std.Dev Coef. Std.Dev 
INTERCEPT 5.77*** 0.59   
LSIZE -0.05*** 0.01   
LPRATIO -0.88*** 0.02 -0.88*** 0.02 
LAREA 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09 
LRETAIL -0.20** 0.08 -0.16** 0.08 
LMIGRANTS 0.17*** 0.06 0.11** 0.06 
PRIVATE 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.07 
FI -0.06 0.08 -0.08 0.08 
LD.CBD 0.11*** 0.05 0.12*** 0.05 
LD.TRAIN -0.38*** 0.11 -0.33*** 0.11 
DIS1 2.29*** 0.03 2.37*** 0.03 
DIS2 1.44*** 0.05 1.57*** 0.05 
DIS3 0.86*** 0.57 0.90*** 0.57 
LCITYSUB -0.05 0.35 -0.05 0.35 
QUARTER1 -0.17** 0.16 -0.12 0.16 
QUARTER2 -0.12 0.03 -0.09 0.03 
QUARTER3 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.07 
QUARTER4 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.06 
QUARTER5 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 
QUARTER6 0.14 0.07 0.19** 0.07 
R Squares 0.9 0.92 
F Statistics 123.77 158.79 
In-sample MSE 0.14 0.11 
Out-of-sample MSE 0.1 0.11 
Specification Test 
2 5203.88, p-value < 0.01 (Whang & Andrews 1993 ) 
*: Significant at the 10% level 
**: Significant at the 5% level 
***: Significant at the 1% level 
 
                                                        
16 In 2006, among the 59 major projects undertook by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban 
Planning (BMCUP), only seven projects are industrial development (www.bjghw.gov.cn).  


























The nonlinear price-size relationship is much more obvious for industrial lands. 
The price-size pattern depicted in Figure 4 suggests that unit land price increases with 
parcel size initially and then decreases thereafter.  All else equal, the most expensive 
industrial land parcels in Beijing are roughly 2,000 squared metres in size.  We also find 
that land price is negatively related to plot ratio.  The magnitude of  coefficient loadings 
is larger for industrial land: the coefficient estimate of  PRATIO is -0.88 for industrial 
land versus a -0.36 for non-industrial land sold by private treaty.   
 
Neighborhood factors are more relevant in the determination of  industrial land 
values. From Table 6, industrial land buyers are interested in land parcels in districts with 
less retails, and more migrants.  Considering that industrial activities require significant 
storage spaces and an abundant supply of  labor, this finding is not surprising.  
 
Distance to the subway network was not found to be important in pricing industrial 
land.  On the other hand, buyers prefer land parcels that are further away from the 
CBD and close to a train station (in Table 6 the coefficient of  LD.TRAIN is -0.33 and 
significant: this shows that the further away one is from the station the less valuable 
industrial land is).  Unlike developed countries where air transportation moves the 
most of  the freight, rail transportation system still handles most domestic freight in 
China (Xie et al., 2002). Consequently buyers pay a premium to secure land parcels that 
are close to rail transportation hubs.  It is also clear that the most expensive industrial 
land parcels are located in the inner city region, whilst the cheapest ones can be found in 
the outer suburb districts.  
 
Although industrial land prices are found to be influenced by traditional price 
determinants as discussed above, foreign investment companies are not paying more 
compared with their domestic counterparts. There are no evidences that foreign 
invested companies are treated favorably in private treaty of  industrial land sales. Thus 
the second hypothesis is not supported by this set of  findings.  
 
 
The last observation from Table 6 is that the industrial land prices in Beijing have 




 Although there has been growing interest in the land and housing markets in China, 
empirical studies in this area remain scarce. Case study and qualitative analysis methods 
dominate the literature.  There is a lack of  empirical analyses using statistical methods.  
Ding (2004) is the closest to our study.  He uses a hedonic price model to study land 
sale prices in Beijing from 1993 to 2000. However, industrial and non-industrial land 
sales are modeled together; only two factors (distance to CBD and planning uses) are 
considered in the hedonic regression model; and, the OLS technique adopted by Ding 
does not allow flexible estimation of  the hedonic price coefficients.  In Tan, Heerink 
and Qu (2006), a richer set of  independent variables are included in the two regression 
models. However, the purpose of  their study is to understand the causes of  land 
fragmentation, instead of  the determinants of  land value. Hence it is not directly 
relevant to our study. 
 
 In sum, there are limited empirical studies about China’s land market in the current 
literature.  Our study fills the gap in the literature in two ways.  Firstly, this paper 
analyzes prices of  non-industrial and industrial land separately using a comprehensive 
data set and a semi-parametric framework.  Our empirical findings support this 
approach by showing that the price determination mechanism is different for the two 
types of  lands.  The data and flexible model specification allow the hedonic price 
coefficients to be estimated more accurately. Secondly, and more importantly, we find 
evidences that land prices in China are determined by both market force and ‘Chinese 
Characteristics’.  The land market, although established only recently, is at work. In line 
with the literature, determinants such as size and planning uses are found to be 
important in determining land prices. On the other hand, the market is not completely 
efficient because certain buyers paid less by leveraging their access to resources (e.g., 
pro-foreign-investor policies). Although this is only observed in non-industrial land sales 
by private treaty, this type of  sales account for about 65% of  all transactions in our 




We investigate the land value determination in Beijing China by estimating separate 
models for industrial and non-industrial land sales.  We find that Beijing land prices are 
affected by the standard attributes and in the standard ways (e.g. lots closer to 
transportation are worth more) as in traditionally markets.   Beijing land market prices 
are determined by parcel size, floor space, location, neighborhood characteristics and 
planning uses.  Nevertheless, evidence is also found that some “Chinese 
Characteristics” still exist.  Foreign investment companies pay less to obtain land use 
rights through private treaties.  Possible reasons include that state owned and privately 
owned domestic companies are scale-drive instead of  profit-driven; foreign investors 
can negotiate a better price under pro-foreign-investment policies. These are some 
unique Chinese characteristics..  
 
In conclusion we find land values in China are determined by both market and 
non-market elements.  It is very encouraging to see an effective land market in force. 
Land users determine the price to pay based on the characteristics of  the land and its 
surrounding environment.  The government is also able to use the similar information 
to determine the reserve price for tenders and public auctions. Of  course, some unique 
factors should also be considered when determining the land value in China.  Our 
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